By Prof Hassan A. Saliu
Introduction
A few days ago, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) provided highlights on the forthcoming general elections, particularly regarding the total number of registered voters, now estimated at 103 million, and their distribution across states and demographic categories. At the press conference, INEC Chairman, Prof. Joash Amupitan, also raised concerns about campaign finance flows and reiterated the legal framework governing the announcement of election results.
This latter aspect has continued to generate considerable debate within the public sphere. The controversy traces back to the 2023 presidential election, when technical glitches in the result transmission process undermined public confidence in the outcome’s integrity. In that context, a school of thought has argued that while INEC retains the exclusive constitutional mandate to declare final results, such exclusivity should not preclude critical stakeholders and interest groups from monitoring result transmission at every stage, up to upload on the INEC Result Viewing Portal (IReV). INEC, on its part, has cautioned stakeholders to be circumspect and to operate within the ambit of the law to avert potential crises arising from unstructured or parallel announcement of results.
This remains a difficult balance to strike, given the prevailing scepticism about the electoral umpire’s willingness and capacity to ensure procedural justice for all contending interests. It is hoped that this contention will not impinge on the credibility of the forthcoming presidential election or precipitate post-election instability.
Rationale and Scope
With less than 100 days to the presidential election scheduled for January 2027, it is apposite to critically examine the electoral geography and assess the relative strengths of the leading parties. For analytical convenience, and given the level of public interest they have generated, this intervention focuses on three dominant parties: the African Democratic Congress (ADC), the All Progressives Congress (APC), and the National Democratic Congress (NDC).
It must be emphasised that this analysis does not seek to predict the eventual winner of the election. Rather, it is an exploratory exercise in identifying observable patterns and tendencies, which may prove accurate or otherwise. This is the first in a projected series of three pre-election commentaries.
Traditional Strongholds and Emerging Dynamics
The three parties under consideration possess identifiable traditional strongholds where they are expected to perform relatively well. The ADC appears to have consolidated its support base in the core North, comprising the North-West and North-East geopolitical zones. The salient question, however, is how many votes these blocs can deliver to make it victorious at the polls. Surely, the party needs to woo voters from other zones. While the APC recorded a strong performance in these zones in the last presidential election, current projections suggest a substantial haul for the ADC, driven by the blocs’ number of states, their numerical dominance on the voter register, and prevailing grievances against the ruling party.
Nevertheless, the party may face significant constraints in the southern states, where sentiments around rotational presidency remain potent. Furthermore, the wave of developments around the Allied Peoples Movement (APM) in Bauchi State and a few North-Eastern states needs to be watched more carefully because it could reduce ADC votes in the zone. One must, however, recognise Mr. Rotimi Amaechi’s selection as the party’s Vice-Presidential candidate as a move that will ensure more votes come from the South-South political zone.
The NDC, on the other hand, is likely to replicate its presidential candidate’s impressive performance in the South-East in 2023, where he secured up to 90 per cent of votes in some states. However, several structural shifts may undermine a seamless repeat performance. These include: (a) the increase in the number of APC governors in the region and their demonstrable commitment to mobilise support for the ruling party; (b) the emergence of the rainbow coalition, which could potentially channel additional votes to the APC at the presidential level, despite existing friction between its arrowhead and most APC governors; (c) the strategic alliance between the sole All Progressives Grand Alliance (APGA) governor in the region and the APC; and (d) the political disposition of a Labour Party governor whose body language suggests tacit preference for the APC presidential candidate. Nevertheless, the surprise performance of its presidential candidate without traditional structures in the 2023 presidential election suggests that structural influence may be limited in these circumstances. The choice of its Vice-Presidential candidate, who is a consummate politician from Kano, may limit the impact of the party’s lack of national spread.
For the APC, the South-West is expected to remain its most formidable base, given that its presidential candidate hails from the zone. Ethnic solidarity is likely to be a significant mobilisation factor, provided the party refines its strategy to mitigate potential vote losses to the APM. Nonetheless, pervasive economic hardship and unaddressed grievances in parts of the zone could erode its support. However, the Governor of Osun State’s announcement of support for the APC presidential candidate is a morale booster for the party in the zone.
The Battleground Zones
Beyond the established strongholds, the two remaining geopolitical zones — North-Central and South-South — are likely to constitute the principal battlegrounds where the eventual outcome may be determined. In the North-Central, the bulk of votes is likely to be split between the NDC and APC, with religious considerations playing a pivotal role, as in the contest between the Labour Party and the APC in the last presidential election. The party that secures this zone may be well-positioned for overall victory.
The South-South appears to be another swing zone. Historically a stronghold of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), the party’s recent electoral decline, culminating in its recognised faction aligning with the ruling party, has effectively removed it from contention. Drawing on the 2023 results, in which the Labour Party did very well in the zone, and considering that its erstwhile candidate has now defected to the NDC and that the NDC Chairman hails from the zone — with a record of notable electoral victories in his native Bayelsa State — the NDC is expected to perform strongly. However, the political landscape has shifted considerably: all governors in the region are now in the APC, a development of considerable significance given the ruling party’s emphasis on institutionalised electoral strategy. Furthermore, the emergence of the rainbow coalition may dilute the electoral picture emerging from the region, at least in one state. Consequently, the party that resonates most with the electorate in this region may gain a decisive advantage.
Key Constraints and Strategic Imperatives
Some critical factors are likely to shape the fortunes of the leading parties. These are:
1.The APC and the Burden of Reforms: While the reform agenda of the APC-led administration may be deemed necessary, its implementation has engendered widespread hardship and indiscriminate impoverishment, largely because the electorate was not sufficiently carried along. The party needs to realise that democratic governance entails responsiveness to popular concerns. This hardship factor could result in significant vote losses. Some voters have also complained that the party, especially its government, marginalises sections of the country. A pragmatic intervention, such as a scheme to significantly reduce fuel pump prices, could substantially boost its popularity before the election, despite the favourable statistics and ratings its government is receiving from some domestic and international rating agencies. The party also needs to avoid showing traces of overconfidence as it approaches the upcoming elections. The question arises: how many votes can the zone deliver to make the party victorious in the election? The APC must do well in other zones. Its biggest advantage in the next presidential election is the fractured opposition, though it would be unwise to assume that the opposition has gone to sleep without considering other strategic options.
2.The ADC and the Challenge of Perception: The ADC is increasingly perceived as a viable alternative platform. However, it is constrained by two major limitations: first, an image problem affecting both the party and its candidate; and second, limited grassroots penetration beyond media visibility, particularly outside the core North, where its messaging is viewed with suspicion. The party’s most critical weakness is its simplistic assumption that the prevailing hardship alone will automatically translate into votes, treating the electorate as an automated mechanism primed to vote out the incumbent. This is an overly reductionist premise. Strategically, the party needs to broaden its alignment with other opposition platforms, without an entitlement mentality driving it, and intensify efforts in southern states. It must also guard against overconfidence, a factor that has historically truncated many presidential ambitions.
3.The NDC and Institutional Deficit: The NDC is generally perceived as a relatively new political bloc with prospects based on the personality of its presidential candidate, who is being seen as a somewhat new face in the presidential race. However, its challenges include a weak institutional structure and ineffective communication of its policy agenda to the Nigerian public. Additionally, its perception as a regional platform remains a liability. To overcome these, the party needs to adopt a more pragmatic approach to coalition-building with other opposition groups, show greater clarity and firmness on national issues, and reduce its heavy reliance on social media platforms for electoral victory. The party must keep its net wide open. Furthermore, its support base must exhibit greater tolerance for dissenting views, recognising that presidential elections involve a broad spectrum of voters whose preferences are fluid and may eventually shift in favour of the NDC if cultivated. Its ability to make inroads into other zones will be an advantage.
Conclusion
In sum, both INEC and the political parties appear to be gearing up for what promises to be a consequential presidential election. While some commendable steps have been taken to enhance electoral competitiveness, certain critical actions remain undone, which could undermine their prospects. At present, observable indicators exist, but they are not sufficiently robust to definitively project victory for any party. Indeed, discussions around a possible run-off election have already emerged. These developments therefore warrant close, continuous monitoring. The election, though less than 100 days away, still allows considerable time for shifts in political dynamics.
The author is of the Department of Political Science, the University of Ilorin in Nigeria
