Fear, Identity Securitisation and Power Politics in Nigeria

By Chris Kwaja

 Introduction

Nigeria’s political and security crises are frequently explained through the country’s ethnic and religious diversity. Such explanations, however, risk treating identity as an inherently conflictual phenomenon and overlooking the political processes through which identities become sources of exclusion, fear and violence. There is a sense in which Nigeria’s security predicament is better understood through the interaction of identity politicisation, struggles over political power, and securitisation. Ethnicity, religion, region, indigeneity and the localised notions of belonging and othering are not simply fixed causes of conflict; they are politically constructed by elites, armed groups, and state institutions. Once particular identities are represented as existential threats, extraordinary security measures become easier to justify, while communities increasingly perceive the state and one another through the lens of collective fear.

 Drawing on securitisation theory, I advance three interconnected arguments. First, identity politics in Nigeria is fundamentally a politics of access to power and resources rather than simply a politics of cultural difference. Second, securitisation transforms political and social differences into security threats, thereby making extraordinary responses appear legitimate. Third, the relationship is circular: the politicisation of identity generates insecurity, insecurity intensifies fear, fear increases the salience of identity, and securitising responses can reproduce the very grievances that produced insecurity. The central policy challenge, therefore, is not to eliminate identity but how to prevent identity from becoming the principal currency through which access to power, citizenship, security and state resources are negotiated.

Conceptualising Identity, Power and Securitisation

Identity refers to the ways individuals and communities understand who they are and where they belong. In Nigeria, identity may be ethnic, religious, regional, linguistic, occupational, generational or territorial. Importantly, identity is not necessarily politically divisive. Ethnic and religious identities can provide social solidarity, cultural and community support.

The political problem arises when identity becomes the principal basis for negotiating and allocating political opportunities. In such circumstances, elections can become contests between communities rather than contests between competing policy programmes. Public employment, access to state institutions, land, development projects and political appointments can become interpreted through the question of “which group benefits?”

This is particularly significant because Nigeria has historically attempted to manage diversity through institutional arrangements such as federalism, power-sharing, zoning and the Federal Character Principle. The Federal Character Principle was intended to ensure that the composition of public institutions, as well as the distribution of social amenities reflects the country’s diversity, as well as reduced fears of domination by any single group. Research, however, indicates that the Federal Character Commission has faced legal, administrative, financial and political limitations in the discharge of this important duty.

Identity becomes politicised when political actors deliberately or opportunistically use group boundaries to mobilise support, distribute patronage, construct enemies or legitimise claims to power. The relevant question is therefore not simply “What ethnic or religious groups exist in Nigeria?” but “When, why and by whom are particular identities politically activated?

 The relationship between identity and power is particularly visible in the politics of indigeneity. Nigerian citizenship is formally national, but access to opportunities in particular locations can depend upon whether an individual is regarded as an “indigene” of that state or community. Scholars have argued that this creates a tension between federal citizenship and primordial notions of belonging, privileging ethnic origins over equal citizenship.

Ordinarily, politics involves debate, negotiation and compromise. Security politics is different because it presents an issue as an existential threat requiring urgent and sometimes exceptional action. Securitisation occurs when political actors successfully represent a particular object, group or development as an existential danger and obtain sufficient audience acceptance for extraordinary measures.

Securitisation consequently changes the political meaning of an opponent. A political rival is no longer simply someone with competing interests. A rival can become a threat to the survival of the community. In essence, fear is therefore politically powerful because it reduces the space for compromise. Once citizens believe that their group faces existential threat, political moderation can be interpreted as weakness or betrayal.

The State as Both Solution and Problem

The Nigerian state occupies an ambiguous position in the politics of identity and securitisation. It is simultaneously the institution most capable of managing identity conflict, and an institution that can reproduce insecurity through exclusion, coercion or inequity in the enforcement of rules.

Nigeria’s constitutional and federal arrangements demonstrate that the state has repeatedly attempted to manage diversity institutionally. Federal character, federalism, presidential electoral requirements and national-party rules were designed partly to prevent domination and encourage national integration. Yet, institutional design alone cannot solve the problem if implementation is perceived as partisan or discriminatory.

The deeper problem is therefore institutional trust. Where citizens believe security institutions are neutral, the state can intervene in conflicts without necessarily being interpreted as acting on behalf of one group. Where citizens believe the state is captured by another identity group, even legitimate security operations can be securitised as evidence of persecution.

A Model of the Nigerian Politics of Fear

Rethinking Security in Nigeria

The Nigerian case requires a broader conception of security. National security cannot be reduced to the territorial integrity of the state or the suppression of armed groups. It must include political security, equal citizenship, social trust, economic inclusion and freedom from collective discrimination. In this context, three changes are particularly important:

First, the state should distinguish between identity and violence. Being a member of another community cannot itself constitute a security threat. Security policy must focus on behaviour, organisational capacity and concrete threats rather than collective identities.

Second, conflict analysis must distinguish structural grievances from political manipulation. Land disputes, unemployment, poverty and marginalisation should not automatically be classified as terrorism. At the same time, the existence of legitimate grievances should not be used to excuse violence.

Third, Nigeria needs stronger mechanisms for cross-group political cooperation. Political institutions should reward politicians for building national constituencies rather than narrow ethnic or religious blocs.

Conclusion

Nigeria’s identities are real, historically rooted and socially meaningful. But they become particularly dangerous when the elites transform them into instruments for competition over state power, resources and recognition. Identity politicisation turns social differences into political boundaries; securitisation turns those boundaries into perceived existential threats; and fear makes extraordinary political and coercive responses appear legitimate.

The Nigerian experience also demonstrates that identity politics is not an inevitable consequence of diversity. Evidence of substantial interreligious tolerance shows that Nigerians are capable of coexistence. At the same time, evidence that discrimination increases ethnic identification suggests that exclusion can push citizens away from national identity and toward narrower forms of belonging.

Chris Kwaja is a Professor of International Relations and Strategic Studies at the Centre for Peace and Security Studies, Modibbo Adama University, Yola, Nigeria.