Liberal Democracy and Governance in Nigeria Since 1999: Beyond Consolidation and Reform

Prof Oga Godwin Ajene, the author of this Memorial Lecture in Honor of Professor Billy J. Dudley delivered January 28, 2026 under the auspices of the Nigerian Political Science Association (NPSA) is of Department of Political Science, Rev. Fr. Moses Oshio Adasu University, (formerly known as Benue State University), Makurdi. The text is long but not boring. It has been published in full instead of serialising it following a new wisdom to that effect. We apologise ahead that we still cannot handle tables, charts and infographs and readers might notice faint texts in the two tables in this text.

By Oga Godwin Ajene

Protocols.

Tributes

The famous political scientist, Professor Okwudiba Nnoli once wrote, upon the death of a colleague that “the iroko has fallen”, but then, he himself, an iroko, was standing “gidigba”, as we say in Nigeria. The iroko tree is never alone in the forest. What makes it more significant is the presence of other no less significant trees that surround it. Therefore, while honoring the late Professor Billy Dudley, a fallen iroko in the Nigerian political science forest, I wish to also pay tribute to a shortened list of many in our discipline and others who are irokos in their own right in Nigeria, living and deceased, including non-Nigerians that I met in Nigeria or abroad who form the forest that have left their fragrance on my intellect. Among these are three contemporaries of Billy Dudley, whom I encountered in ABU as teachers; Professors A. D. Yahaya; James O’Connell and Sam Egite Oyovbaire. Others I met as mentors or inspiring senior colleagues or contemporaries. These include: Professors Ibrahim Gambari: Adele Jinadu, Okello Oculi; Jonah Elaigwu; Moibi Amoda, B. Adekanye, Tony Edoh; Ayo Dunmoye: Sonni Tyoden, Yusuf Bangura; Eme Ekekwe, Claude Ake, Tunde Adeniran, Okwudiba Nnoli; Bolaji Akinyemi, Sam Aluko, Okey Ibeanu, Tijanni Bande, Victor Adetula, then there are life-long friends and classmates: Paul Izah, Akase Paul Sorkaa,  and Mvendaga Jibo. There are also those who do not know how much they make me proud, including: Marietu Tenuche, Shedrack Best, Member George-Genyi, James Apam, Timbee Akuul and Franc Abagen. Finally there are two who showed me what hard work and integrity looks like. These are Attahiru Jega and my NPSA President, Hassan Saliu. There are non-Nigerians who I must mention and they include John Collins, Richard Merelman, Marshall Carter Wanke, Paul Becket, Crawford Young, Jack Dennis, Bernard Cohen, Murray Edelman and Fred Hayward. The danger of having a list drawn from a large field traversed by someone above seventy years of age is obvious here but my sincere apology and gratitude are owed to those, inadvertently left out.

Preface

This Lecture is a memorial to a great scholar and pioneer of our discipline of Political Science in Nigeria, late Professor Billy Dudley, In reality what I present before you today is not a lecture in the true sense of the word. It is an attempt to initiate a conversation, a rather unusual one, on the subject of democracy, of which almost everybody is passionate about in Nigeria today.  Who am I to lecture the eminent personalities and gurus of our discipline and the generality of members of the prestigious Nigerian Political Science Association? Furthermore I have chosen this approach, partly as a result of the fact that the points of my conversation are going to be fairly unpalatable, in the same way that the heretic confronts religion. I believe that if the “lecture” is cast in this tone, the underlying seriousness of the views expressed, even for the unconvinced may be more palatable. I therefore crave for your understanding as I discuss the topic that I was privileged to self-select. The focus on “Liberal Democracy and Governance in Nigeria” and the pre-occupation with consolidating and reforming it, obviously falls within the general area of Nigerian Government and Politics, which formed the core academic interest of Professor Billy Dudley. (See 1968, 1973, 1982). While it is doubtful that he would have accepted the arguments put forward here today, Late Professor Billy Dudley would have tolerated the views and I am sure that, he would not in any way be rattled from his deep, peaceful sleep and transformation to eternity. On this note, I also thank any of his relatives that may happen upon this conversation.

The main questions that I wish to tackle in this conversation are:

1. What form of democracy has Nigeria embraced since 1999?
2. What is the best way to conceptualize and understand democracy in Nigeria?
3. Why is there so much passion to consolidate the form of democracy embraced and reform the failing aspects of it?
4. Is it indeed possible to consolidate and reform aspects of it that have derailed?
5. Is it not imperative to contemplate a fundamental shift in principles and practice of democracy in Nigeria?

Answers to these questions are not easy but using evidence obtained from secondary sources and official documents, I will attempt, in no orderly fashion try to focus my dialogue along these lines.

Introduction

The return to democratic rule in Nigeria after many years of military dictatorship was welcomed by the generality of Nigerians, the passion attached to democracy by the once forgotten commoners, the ruling class, and majority of Political Scientists since 1999 after so many years of military rule is pervasive and infectious and no one can be blamed for being part of the conversation. The passion to sustain and consolidate it is so deep seated that it almost amounts to heresy to suggest that we abandon it. Politicians pay lip service to the notion of consolidation and political scientist write not only about consolidation and reforms but some have even imported the religious notion of backsliding to alert citizens to the need to strengthen the guardrails of democracy and bring a new sense of revivalism. Reform has become a buzzword and practical solution to the ubiquitous malaise of democracy in Nigeria. It is taboo to talk about military coup just the same way as it means the trip back to Egypt by the Israeli party of Moses. Senator Joseph Waku from Benue State may have lost his second chance at Senate seat in 2003 by merely suggesting that a military coup had become necessary in the light of the corruption he witnessed in government within the short period of democratic rule. Alternative view that contemplates revolutionary change, which would see the dismantling of democracy as currently practiced in Nigeria is clearly outside and beyond the conversation of both scholars and the general population.  Yet, the consequences of the original sin of embracing the form of democracy handed to us are indelible. As one of my Professors used to say, “once you have tasted the fruit of knowledge and evil, you will never be innocent again” (O, Connell 1972). In truth however, the transformation of either our political culture of corruption, electoral malfeasance, institutional rot and decay through reform is neither practical nor achievable as long as we continue to consolidate on the path of democracy that we have chosen. Nigeria is hardly a functional liberal democracy but all indications are that the country has embraced the liberal form of democracy, usually built on the foundation of liberal economy. It was the interplay between liberal economy and liberal democracy that was the foundation of Western imperialism. Indeed there is agreement among some very prominent social and economic theorists of the liberal right and Marxist left that capitalism was an essential part and inseparable ingredient of liberal democracy. (Schumpeter, 1950) (Macpherson 1977) (Lindblom, 2003:281). Since this reality has been lying in plain site for nearly a century before the independence of Nigeria and other African countries, it is baffling that many African countries intent on kicking out colonialism did not reject liberal democracy at the same time. Credit must be given to some African countries such as Tanzanian and Ghana that attempted, with varying degrees of depth and elaboration to embrace alternatives.

The story does not end with failure to reject. For many years, the religion of liberal democracy has preached that the only narrow route to the paradise of development is the one that leads through liberal democracy. (Acemolglu, Johnson,&Robinson 2005; Aminu Bolaji & Gbenga 2014) In Nigeria, the search has been for the illusive “dividends of democracy”. The rapid transformation of China, which whole-heartedly rejected that route and has become the world center of innovation and development, is testament to a long-standing scam. Moreover, developments in what is often mistakenly considered to be the bastion of Liberal democracy, the United States of America, where it has been projected as “work in progress” for more than two hundred and fifty years, has in the last few years, especially under President Donald Trump exposed the fragility of liberal democracy, which became the unadulterated model that Nigeria and most other African countries have embraced.

Conceptions and Misconceptions of democracy in Nigeria

  The most elementary conception of democracy, which is almost universally cited is the one offered by the American President, Abraham Lincoln, who at a speech at Gettysburg in 1863 defined democracy as the “government of the people, by the people, for the People.” This elegant and catchy definition has given room for a wide range of practical applications, distinguished by different qualifications such as: liberal democracy, plural democracy, social democracy and people’s democracy. In Nigeria, It has become clear, at least from recent discussions among Political Scientist, that there is no consensus about how to qualify the nature of our democracy. Questions have arisen as to whether what we have is specifically a Nigerian version of democracy or whether it is democracy in Nigeria. (NPSA, Engagement with Democracy, 2025). To cast the question this way would normally be taken to mean that one was drawing attention to the monumental failure in the practice of liberal democracy in Nigeria. However, from discussions it is clear that there is no consensus among Scholars that Nigeria is struggling to run a liberal form of democracy. One prominent scholar (Jinadu, 2025) appears to suggest characterizations of Nigerian democracy based on a set of principles in the Constitution of The Federal Government of Nigeria 1999: On the one hand, he suggests that since Nigeria had always been a federal constitution, with regions based on ethnic nationalities, and the requirements of federal character in our constitution, these offered a peculiar characterization to Nigeria democracy. In what became a more unambiguous characterization of Nigerian democracy, he cites the “fundamental principle of state” found in chapter 1I of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of 1999 (as amended) to suggest that Nigerian democracy is thereby a “Social Democracy”. In this presentation, we politely reject these characterizations as misconceptions. Indeed, the emptiness of that provision in the Constitution is evident in the restriction placed on the Judiciary in the same constitution, which limits exercise of its powers over the Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State by implying that:

“…the Courts of law; except as otherwise provided by this Constitution, judicial powers shall not extend to any issue or question as to whether any act of omission by any authority or person or as to whether any law or any judicial decision is in conformity with the Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy set out in Chapter II of this Constitution.(Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, (as amended) (Section 6(6)(c).

By this provision, often referred to, as the non-justiciablity of the provisions on Fundamental Objectives of State and Directive Principles of State Policy in the Constitution, to use the section as a basis for characterizing Nigeria as a Social Democracy is a misconception and therefore politely rejected.

In order to clear the apparent misconceptions about democracy in Nigeria, we reject the view that constitutional structure of a country determines the character of its democratic credentials. The only conceivable basis in which the structure may be known to determine the democratic character of a country is when there is constitutional provision for rotation of power between ethnic or regional groups as in what scholars have termed “consociational democracy” (Lijphart, 1977). Nigeria’s federal character has no bearing on Democracy, almost the same way that the British Unitary government, with its local regional governments has no bearing on its liberal democracy. The second misconception is that we can derive the characterization of Nigerian Democracy from the “fundamental Principle of State” as embedded in the Constitution of the Federal Republic and thereby characterize Nigerian Democracy as “Social Democracy”. Except in the same way in which certain countries characterize themselves either as  “People’s Republic” as in China or “Democratic Republic” as in North Korea, to characterize Nigeria as a “Social democracy’ is to say the least an absurdity. Just as the fundamental Principles of State in the Nigerian Constitution has no force of law, it also has no effect on the character of Nigerian democracy.

The Defining elements of liberal democracy

The goals of consolidation and reforms of the institutions and practices of democracy in Nigeria are really intended to bring the Country in line with Western liberal democracy. It is therefore important to highlight the defining elements of liberal democracy and how the goals of “democratic consolidation” and “reforms” in Nigeria are intended to align with liberal democracy.  These major defining elements of liberal democracy include:

1. Political participation
2. Universal adult suffrage
3. Political pluralism
4. Free, Fair and Regular elections
5. Rule of Law
6. Protection of individual liberties and rights
7. Separation of powers and limited government
8. Accountability and transparency
9. Independent judiciary and the media

Each of these items has corresponding provisions in the Nigerian Constitution, or supplemental legislation guiding them. So they are not merely principles but facts of law that are “justiciable”. Let us briefly examine the corresponding legal provision for each of these:

Table 1. Principles of Liberal democracy and Provisions in the Nigerian Constitutional and other Legal instruments.

 

	Elements of Liberal democracy	Provision in the Nigerian Legal Instruments
1.	Political Participation	Nigerian Constitution 1999(As Amended) a.     Section 40 freedoms of assembly and association, allowing citizens to form or join political parties. The Electoral Act 2022, Part II specifies qualification for  political participation
2	Universal Adult suffrage	Nigerian Constitution 1999 (As Amended) Sections 77(2), 117 (2), 132 (5) Provides for Universal adult suffrage.
3	Political Pluralism	Various provisions of the Nigerian Constitution 1999 (As amended) provide for political pluralism a.     Section 2 establishes Nigeria as a Federation of states, Federal Capital and Local governments b.     Section 14(3) and (4) Mandate Government to conduct its affairs in a manner that reflects the “Federal Character of the country. c.     Various provisions recognize and accommodate Nigeria’s diverse religious, ethnic and cultural diversities.
4.	Free, fair and regular elections	Nigerian Constitution 1999 (As Amended) a.     Section 14,(2) ( C) ensures the participation of people in their government. b.     Provisions which stipulates terms for elected officials at all levels ensures regular elections c.     Various provisions of the Electoral Act. 2022, including the independence of INEC are intended to ensure free and fair elections.
5	Rule of Law	Nigerian Constitution 1999 (As Amended): a.     Section 1 establishes the Constitution as supreme and binding on all persons and authorities b.     Chapter IV guarantees fundamental rights and c.     Chapter III provides for judicial powers
6	Provision of individual liberties and rights	Nigerian Constitution 1999 (As amended): Chapter IV guarantees a range of Rights and liberties
7	Separation of powers and limited government	Nigerian Constitution 1999 (As Amended) Sections 4, 5, 6. Divide government Authority among the legislature, Executive and the Judiciary
8	Accountability and transparency	Nigerian Constitution 1999 (As amended) a.     Section 22 provides an obligation on the mass media to “at all times be free to uphold the fundamental objectives and uphold the responsibility of Government to the people. b.     Section 80 -89, and 120 – 129 Grant the National Assembly and State Houses of Assembly powers of control over public funds. They are to audit, supervise and have power to conduct investigation into the expenditure of public funds. c.     5th Schedule of the Constitution mandates the Auditor General; to audit all accounts of the Federation and submit report to the national Assembly d.     The Freedom of Information Act of 2011 provides a framework for public access to public records.
9	Independence of the judiciary and the media	Nigerian Constitution 1999(as amended) a.     Section 6 Vests judicial powers on the courts b.     Section 36(1) guarantees fair hearing by independent and impartial judiciary c.     Section (2) and (3) provide for financial autonomy

Sources: Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended), Official Gazette No. 61 Lagos – 29th March, 2022 Vol. 109 Government Notice No. 63)  (FOIA) 2011, Electoral Act 2022

Historical evolution of liberal democracy in Nigeria

 The historical evolution of Nigeria and the deliberate policies and practices of governments during the transitional phase before Independence and after that, reflect a very deliberate effort to build a plural democratic society with a robust aspiration to become a full-fledged liberal democracy.

Although the legislative councils that predated Nigeria’s Independence were anything but representative or democratic, they nonetheless provided, albeit symbolically, the Westminster Parliamentary model of democratic practice. This was not only intended to set the tone for post-Independence practice but also to school the emerging elite on the rituals of parliamentary politics, complete with adversarial multi-party system. The structures and practices were not tossed when Independence was gained but instead the independence constitution affirmed the practices. However less than a decade into Independence the underlying fragility of these inherited alien practice collapsed under the weight of ethno-regional politics and a frail neo-colonial economy that was inadequate to dull the sharp edges of ethno-regional politics, particularly because independent bourgeoisies had hardly emerged in Nigeria to sustain the new democracy.

The military interregnum in Nigeria between 1966 and the Civil war that took place between 1967 and 1970 were reflective of the systemic weakness of the Nigerian political economy, which was characterized by an insignificant, weak and disorganized bourgeoisie. The armed forces, slightly more organized and disciplined segment of society, but not immune to the fissures of society held sway until it became clear that they themselves were a problem. The pressures from Western powers, whose economic and political interests are better served by democracies that mirror their interest, forced the transitions to civilian politics, first in 1979 and again in 1999. The 1979 Constitution that ushered in the Second Republic was now modeled on the Presidential Constitution of the United States of America. This meant that democratic structures, institutions and practices followed the liberal conception of American democracy.

Beyond the historical evolution of Nigerian democracy, which was modeled along those of Liberal Western Democracies, efforts by Nigerian democratic governments, together with their donor partners have focused largely on “ consolidating” institutions and practices of liberal democracy. Furthermore institutions and practices that are lagging behind in attaining the goals of liberal democracy have become the main focus of “ “reforms”. The electoral system and the party system, and the public service are among the most important focus of these reforms. Other Institutions, including the judiciary, the legislature and the executive have also been a focus of these reforms. Other areas of intervention to bring Nigerian democracy in line with liberal democracy include the building of a robust civil society groups and the bid to build a free and unfettered press. If these items for consolidation and reforms do not convince those that erroneously view Nigerian democracy as social democracy, they should also refer to the massive effort of the various democratic governments in Nigeria to privatize the economy largely through the pressures of International financial institutions such as World Bank, IMF and other donor agencies of the West. Indeed the privatization of public enterprises that took place during the Obasanjo Administration between 1999 and 2007 as well as other programmes that came under the policy of National Economic Empowerment Development Strategy (NEEDS), their state and local government versions with their respective acronyms of SEEDS and LEEDS were all engineered and funded by international agencies such as DFID, World Bank and the IMF as part of efforts at liberalization of the economy. The removal of oil subsidy, floating of the currency and tax reforms by the Tinubu administration are all part of the process of economic liberalization, It may thus be stated categorically that every indicator identifies Nigeria as a country aspiring to become a liberal democracy. The so-called consolidation and reforms are aimed at attaining acceptable levels of liberal democratic order.

Top of FormTo summarize the main points of this section, we wish to state categorically that, to the extent that all liberal democracies cast the imperfections of the systems as: “ work in progress” Nigerian Democracy may be characterized as an aspiring liberal democracy, which as we shall point out later is “work in futility” The colonial democratic inheritance, the post-colonial institutions, structures and processes, including the Nigerian Constitution and supplementary legislations are all attempts to establish the credential of Nigeria as a liberal democracy. Indeed, when the concepts of consolidation and reforms are used, they apply to the basic elements of liberal democracy outlined earlier.

The Concept of Governance

The concept of governance as used in this presentation refers, broadly to the exercise of power through a country’s economic, social, and political institutions. These institutions according to the UN represents the organizational rules, routines, formal laws and informal norms, which together shape the incentives of public policy makers, overseers and providers of public service  (UNDP 2007). The normative basis for these rules, routines and formal laws in a liberal democracy are derived from the set of principles earlier elaborated, including the principles of separation of powers, rule of law, free and fair elections, independence of the judiciary, and accountability. This is also in line with the definition offered by the “Institute of Governance” which views governance as involving who determines who has power, who makes decisions, how players make their voices heard and how the account is rendered (cited in  Nabiebu & Olu (2019). The ultimate objective of governance is efficiency, transparency and the ability to satisfy and promote the greatest good for the greatest number of citizens. This is the notion of “good governance” which the constitutions of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) required of both the legislature and the Executive arms of government. (Sections 4, 5 and 6)

The literature on Democracy and Governance in Nigeria

Since the dawn of the Nigerian’s fourth Republic, no subject has engaged the interest of both Nigerian scholars and pundits as much as the subject of democracy. Many conferences and workshops have been devoted to the subject and the literature is vast. One way to make meaning of the diverse concerns in the literature is to provide a threefold categorization that helps to organize the broad array of writings on the subject. Like all categorizations, the works in each category are not exclusive of relevance in the other categories and they are not exhaustive. They only represent samples of each category.

The first category of the literature on democracy in Nigeria focuses on the outputs of democracy. Theoretically, democracy is a system of governance which outputs include equal participation, upholding the principles of justice and the rule of law and in reality guaranteeing free and fair elections, freedom of expression and association; ensuring accountability in the organs of State administration; providing opportunities for citizens. Furthermore, democracies are expected to secure lives and property by providing avenue for peaceful resolution of conflicts.  Most importantly, democracy is presumed to facilitate development and facilitate fair distribution of resources. (Leftwitch 1996), According to Pennock (1979:p7), the purpose of democracy is “the government by the people, where liberty, equality and fraternity are secured to the greatest possible degree and in which human capacities are developed to the utmost, by means including free and full discussion of common problems and interests While the failure to realize these outputs in Nigeria, often termed ‘the dividends of democracy” (Omatola, 2007), (Udensi et al. 2023) has concerned many scholars the most prominent is the concern with development (Ake, 1996, Ogbonna, & Ogbonna. 2021). Most scholars working in this area generally agree that democracy in Nigeria has not facilitated the required development due to monumental corruption and mismanagement of resources. (Ojewumi & Adelekan, 2025; Ochuko & Efeurhobo ,2023; Udensi et al., 2023; (Idris, 2013),

A second category of literature on democracy in Nigeria focuses on the organization or functioning of institution of democracy and the processes. Such institutions as the legislature, the Executive and the Judiciary, the electoral governing body (INEC), political parties as well as the regional and Federal structures are in this category. Because the institutions of democracy are many, much of the work is found in this area. These include concerns with the roles of specific institutions such as the Judiciary (Okeke & Idike 2017; Chukwuma, 2023; Omatola, 2011; Adike, Ukeje & Nwachuku 2020), the implications of bicameralism (Arowolo, (2025); relationships between some of the institutions such as between the Executive and Legislative arms of government (Jombo, 2022); Some of the work in this area also focuses on the weaknesses of the institutions (Azoro, Onah, & Agulefo, 2021; Nzereogu, D..C. 2024) There is significant work on the functioning of the national electoral management body, Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) including work by Okafor-Dibua, (2025); Erunke, Goni & Himwan (2025). Apart from the work on INEC there is also much work on the process of elections in Nigeria, including those by Ibeanu, (2020); Abunimye,; Iwara; Emmanuel. (2024). Almost without exception, these works reveal the fundamental problems and the malfunctioning of the institutions and processes of democracy in Nigeria. Much of these problems will be highlighted later but suffice it to say that it is these problems that have led to a large number or works devoted to the challenges of democracy in Nigeria, which is the focus of the next category of literature on democracy in Nigeria.

The third and final category of the literature on democracy in Nigeria focuses on challenges to different aspects of the democratic system.  This is often accompanied by suggestions about the solutions to the challenges. Scholars have focused on the challenges of democracy and development in Nigeria. For example, Olu-Adeyemi, (2012) identified self, serving leadership, corruption, human rights violations, civil strife and integrity of elections as main challenges of democracy in Nigeria while Ogbonna and Ogbonna, (2021: p. 237) suggest two underlying challenges to democracy and development in Nigeria. These according to him include: “imitation and replication of democratic concepts and militarized-democracy phenomenon” of which, such issues as corruption, mismanagement, nepotism are symptoms. Some scholars have examined one main issue in discussing the challenges to democracy in Nigeria. These focus include those on leadership, (Mumuni, 2024), while Ojewumi & Adelekan (2025), as well as Okeke, Muoneke aad Odigbo, (2023) focus on Corruption. Of greater significance are those who have examined more broadly the challenge of liberalism for democracy in Nigeria. In their work on Liberalism and the challenge of democracy in Nigeria, Oyigebe & Yakubu (2023) employed a liberal perspective to identify the challenges to Nigeria Democracy, pointing at ethnic cleavages, poverty, electoral malpractice and weak democratic institutions. Unfortunately the arguments in these perspectives become cyclical and fail to address the fundamental contradictions of the liberal democratic order that underlie its application to governance in Nigeria.

 The Literature on “Consolidation and Reform”

The concept of Consolidation in the context of democracy applies to recent and emerging democracies whose institutions and processes are expected to take root. Reform on the other hand applies to the required remedies for the challenges that have emerged in the course of establishing and implementing the institutions and processes of democracy. The literature on Democracy in Nigeria is replete with these two concepts for the obvious reasons that the process of consolidation is not taking place or that it might be helpful for furthering different aspects or goals of democracy. Similarly, the prevalence of the concept of reform may suggest that many challenges have arisen in the process of democratic consolidation and that reforms may be the magic pill for what has turned out to be the enduring crisis of liberal democracy in Nigeria. The literature bears out this reason for the prevalence of the two concepts in the literature. For example, Ebegbulem (2017) highlights “the imperatives of democratic consolidation” Abubinimye, Iwara, and Emmanuel (2024) stress the importance of elections and the judiciary for democratic consolidation, while Ulu, and Okogbuo (2025) view the phenomenon of political party defections as part of the crisis of democratic consolidation. Similarly the word “reform” is all over the map of the literature on democracy in Nigeria, even when institutions and processes have hardly “consolidated.” Ibrahim (2020) believes that institutional reforms could bring about electoral integrity. Arugu & Charles (2019) argue that electoral reforms could bring about democratization in the local governments. Omatola (2011) examines the prospects of democratic consolidation through electoral reforms and clearly indicates skepticism about the prospects of electoral reform outcomes. Indeed, in one of his outbursts, former President Olusegun Obasanjo averred that: “even if Jesus came down, electoral reforms in Nigeria cannot produce the desired outcome” (The Nation, May 2 2010).

The import of most of the work on democracy in Nigeria as highlighted in the literature review is that they have, almost without exception laid bare the fundamental problems of liberal democracy in Nigeria. The major gap in most of the work however, is that they are stuck in the same theoretical assumptions and frameworks that led to unrealistic expectations about liberal democracy and so end up with faulty solutions and recommendations. Any keen observer of Nigerian democracy will realize that after twenty-five years of the fourth Republic and experimenting with the 1999 constitution (as amended), democratic institutions and processes are not consolidating. If anything, their trajectory is towards chaos and dysfunction. Reforms are endless and at the end of every election circle, there continue to be the clamour for reforms and we end up with endless reforms. The basic problem is that we have failed to interrogate the historical and economic forces that propel liberal democracy and how they have affected everything from outputs, the structures and processes including the real challenge to liberal democracy itself.  We therefore provide a theoretical framework that places the problems of democracy in Nigeria in its proper perspective.

Theoretical considerations.

The widespread dysfunction in the governance of Nigeria may be situated in the organic but contradictory relationship between capitalism and liberal democracy. Several scholars have clearly traced the development of liberal democracy to a particular phase of capital accumulation and capitalist structure (Schumpeter, 1950) (Macpherson 1977) (Lindblom, 2003:281). According to Macpherson (1977), to understand the specificity of the relationship between capitalism and ‘liberal democracy’, it is necessary to study its origins and development within the context of capitalist class structure. He argues that the 2000 years of history from Athenian exemplar onward presupposes the operation of democracy within social milieus, which were not class divided. However, his view that liberal democracy was formulated from the onset to ‘fit’ a democratic system onto a class divided society is more appropriately modified here to state that: liberal democracy was the natural outcome of a class divided society in which the inherent conflict between the bourgeoisie and labour over surplus value are resolved through the freedoms offered by liberal democracy. Such basic freedoms offered by liberal democracy, including: individual freedom, private property rights, and a freedom from concentrated power were complimentary to economic rights of both classes. However, the contradictions within the relationship exist, which create tensions in all liberal democracies. These contradictions include the promise of equality in liberal democracies and the actual propensity towards inequality in the process of accumulation at the economic level, with its political consequences. Secondly, class conflicts tend to exacerbate as discrepancy in wealth distribution increases, and finally, there is the contradiction when the short-term interest and profit motivation of the bourgeoisie clash with the long- term public good of society as whole.

The emergence of liberal democracy in Nigeria was therefore not a matter of choice, by the ‘people’ and it did not arise as a major consensus among competing autochthonous classes within the Nigerian Political Economy. To understand the current phase of relationship between liberal democracy and governance in Nigeria, particularly the resultant futility of desired governance outcomes from consolidation and reforms of the liberal democratic institutions and processes, we adopt a systemic political economy formulation of State Capture Theory that was first suggested by scholars such as Hellman, Jones and Kaufmann (2000). The theory describes a condition in which powerful elites, in insidious ways, shape and manipulate the rules, including the laws, institutions and policies for private advantage and gains. Extant theories of corruption such as Public Choice and Rent-Seeking theory by such scholars as Buchanan and Tullock (1962) focused narrowly on the violation of state rules by rent-seeking individuals and corrupt bureaucrats whose corrupt behavior is episodic. The systemic State Capture theory built on these insights by highlighting the systematic shaping of laws, policies, and institutions themselves by powerful actors. According to Kaufman (2024):

The notion of “state capture,” by contrast, refers to the undue influence by members or groups in the economic and political elite in shaping the rules of the game: morphing and distorting the laws, policies, regulations and institutions of the state to their own advantage at the expense of society. The notion of state capture is in fact more akin to the idea of “privatization of the rules of the game” by elite actors than any alleged extortion or abuse by a public officer. (Kaufmann , 2024 p)

Originally, the theory of State Capture propounded by Hellman and his associates (Hellman et al 2000) focused on the relationships between firms and the state in which firms and powerful individuals shape the formation of laws through illicit and non-transparent means. Subsequent reviews of the theory expanded the concept beyond firm–state relations to encompass broader elite networks, including political godfathers, dominant party elites, and economic oligarchs (Kaufmann & Vicente, 2011; Innes, 2014). This broadened formulation emphasized the embedded nature of State Capture within political institutional structures.

Liberal Democracy and State Capture

Nascent liberal democracies such as Nigeria, rising from the transition of colonial imperialism to neocolonialism, are particularly vulnerable to State Capture by alliance of corrupt political class with local bourgeoisie and their international partners. The design of liberal democracy rests on such features as competitive elections; Rule of law; separation of powers; institutional autonomy, and accountability. Democratic consolidation assumes that once these institutions are established and routinized, democratic governance will improve (Linz & Stepan, 1996) and challenges that emerge in the process of consolidation would become subject to reform. However, Systemic State Capture Theory challenges this assumption by demonstrating that the mere existence of democratic institutions does not guarantee democratic outcomes in governance. In captured democracies, formal institutions coexist with informal power structures that shape decision-making processes (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004). The theory of State capture thus provides a useful framework for assessing the various dimensions of the far-reaching consequences of liberal democracy for governance in Nigeria.

Dimensions of State Capture in Nigeria

State capture is witnessed in the subversion of the institutions and processes of liberal democracy with dire consequences for those processes themselves and governance in general. In this case, we focus mainly on: (1) how the principle of separation of powers is subverted by actual relationship between the Executive and the legislature, (2) the subversion of the principle of rule of law through the control of the judiciary (3) The subversion of the principle of competitive political party system by inducements for party defections that lead to emasculation of opposition politics; and (4) The subversion of the principle of free and fair election by control of the Electoral Management body, (INEC) and the electoral process.

 Separation of Power, Executive-Legislative relations and State Capture in Nigeria

The principle of separation of powers in Liberal democracies is intended to check the powers of any individual or authority from evolving into dictatorship. For this reason, Part two of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of 1999 (as amended) embedded the principle of separation of power by spelling out the respective functions of the legislature, the Executive, and the Judiciary in sections 4, 5, and 6, respectively. Legislative powers were vested in the Legislature, the Executive powers in the Executive, while judicial powers were vested in the Judiciary. The Constitution provided for similar power sharing arrangements at the Federal and State levels. The specific functions of the various arms of government were spelt out in the constitution. We focus in this section on the relationship between the legislature and the Executive and how that relationship has institutionalized the process of state capture rather than good governance.

In the exercise of it legislative function of the constitution in Section 4(1 and 2) conferred the powers on the national assembly and the state houses of Assembly to “make laws for peace order and good governance of the Federation. For the Executive, the Constitution in Section 5 (1) vested executive power in the President, and the President ”may, subject to the provisions of any law made by the National Assembly, be exercised by him either directly or through the Vice-President and Ministers of the Government of the Federation or officers in the public service of the Federation… “ (Constitution of the Federal Republic 1999, (as amended)

Checks and balance of power between the three arms of government that would prevent arbitrary rule and the emergence of dictatorship underlie the principle of separation of power under Presidential system of government, which Nigeria adopted in 1999. However, the relationships between the Executive and the legislature at both the Federal and State levels in the governance of the country, revealed a general tendency toward the dominance by the Executive in the struggle among the political class to capture the institutions and resources of the Nigerian State.

 The institutional forms of formal check on the powers of the legislature and the Executive are facilitated by such provisions as the requirement of the President to accent to laws made by the legislature, The President may refuse to assent to laws made by the Legislature and instead veto them. In Nigeria, incidence of outright veto by the President or outright rejection of bills has been rare as Presidents have sometimes deliberately delayed assent, even when the Constitution empowers the National Assembly to override the President if the bill is delayed for 14 days, as was the case with the Petroleum Resource bill which was delayed by President Muhammadu Buhari without consequence. When Presidents have sought to force their agenda into legislation, as was the case with the bid by President Obasanjo to introduce the third term agenda that would effectively extend the two-term Constitutional provision for tenure of the President to three terms, there is usually a lot of attempted inducement or actual financial inducement of Legislators by the President.

Another area that the Constitution empowers the National Assembly to check the actions of the Executive is through its oversight function of the Executive. The oversight function of the Legislature over the Executive is provided in sections 88 and 89 of the Constitution and it empowers the Legislature to conduct investigation as well as the powers to take evidence and summon any person in Nigeria to give evidence. It can also issue a warrant to compel the attendance of any person, and failure to comply with such summon could lead to his compulsion. The oversight function powers phenomenal corruption in which heads of Executive agencies provide financial and other benefits such as preferential employment slots for the candidates  of legislators in order to avoid serious scrutiny. Closely related to this is the practice of budget padding by the legislature. In Nigeria, this practice happens when budgets submitted to the legislature by the Executive goes through defense at the appropriate Committees of the Legislature. In collusion with agencies of the Executive, the budgets are deliberately inflated to provide resources for private appropriation by the top echelon of the bureaucracy and the legislators. The practice is different from the American equivalent of “pork barrel” legislation; in which American Legislators increase the budget proposals to favour developments in their constituencies. The Nigerian version has been in practice since 1999, but assumed an alarming dimension in 2024, which prompted one of the Lawmakers, Senator Mohammed Ali Ndume from Borno to raise alarm to the total displeasure of his colleagues who threatened to impeach him if he did not apologise.

There are key officials of Government appointments, including Ministers, heads of extra-ministerial departments and ambassadors, which are made by the President or Governors, as the case may be, but subject to the confirmation of the Legislature. The appointments are normally expected to draw close scrutiny by the legislators. Because of the corrupt nature of the process as well as the total subservience to the President, in some cases, the nominees hardly go through any serious vetting by the legislature. This has led to serious cases of highly unqualified people or people with questionable credentials being confirmed by the Legislature. The recent case of a Ministerial appointee Mr. Uche Nnaji who did not have the qualifications that he claimed and one other Minister that had forged an NYSC Certificate XXXare examples of the shoddy work of the legislators whose primary interest is the resources they can amass from office rather than the public interest.

Rule of Law, the Judiciary and State Capture in Nigeria 

 In Liberal democracies, the principal institution responsible for safeguarding the Rule of Law is the Judiciary. This is to be achieved through the independence of the Judiciary. In Nigeria, the independence of the Judiciary is nominally ensured through constitutional the provisions for: (1) the appointment of Judges, (2) the removal of Judges, and (3) the appropriation of funds for the recurrent and capital expenditure of the Judiciary. In the context of State Capture in Nigeria, these safeguards are often short-circuited, as this section will illustrate.

The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) Section 6, created the Judiciary as the third and co-equal arm of Government, with the other two arms being the Executive and the legislature, under the doctrine of separation of powers. On the appointment of Judges, For the Judiciary, the 1999 Constitution of the Nigeria (as Amended created federal and state superior courts of record, with specific  jurisdictions and  a compact hierarchy among them. There are seven federal courts, which include: the Supreme Court of Nigeria, the Court of Appeal, the Federal High Court, the National Industrial Court, the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, the Sharia Court of Appeal of the Federal Capital Territory and the Customary Court of Appeal of the Federal Capital Territory. At the level of states, the Constitution established High Court of a State for each of the thirty-six States; and for any state that so requires, it permits it to establish either or both of a Sharia Court of Appeal and a Customary Court of Appeal. (Constitution of the Federal Republic 1999, Sections 270, 275, and 280)

In ensuring the independence of the Judiciary, the appointments of judicial officers were nominally ensured by the establishment of the National Judicial Council (NJC). The powers and responsibilities of the NJC derive from Section 153 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended). It is responsible for appointment of Judges, without interference from the Executive and the Legislature. In practice, the Presidency and the State Governors often influence the submission of names for appointment of Judges. This led a former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court; Justice Walter onnoghen to decry the practice in which State Governors prevent the submission  of names of nominated candidates to the NJC if the names of their preferred candidates are not included. The consequence according to the Chief Justice is that men and women highly deficient in integrity and job performance populate the Judiciary. (quoted in Ahmed, 2022)

Furthermore the confirmation of appointments of Judges by Governors is often stalled as was the case  in Kebbi State, the acting Chief Judge of Kebbi State, Esther

Asabe Karatu wrote a petition to the NJC complaining that the Governor Atiku

Bagudu had refused to confirm her as the substantive Chief Judge of the State.

On January 17, 2019, the Kebbi State House of Assembly confirmed Mrs. Karatu

as substantive Chief Judge of the state, but the governor refused to act on the

Confirmation made by the House of Assembly. (Sahara Reporters, 2019).

The authority for disciplinary actions on Judges, such as dismissal or suspension resides with the NJC. However, The Executive has often overridden the decisions of the NJC as was the case of the President of the Court of Appeal, Justice Ayo Isa Salami, who was the President of the Court of Appeal (PCA). The National Judicial Council suspended Justice Ayo Isa Salami over his refusal to apologise to the NJC and the then Chief Justice of Nigeria, Justice Aloysius Katsina Alu. Justice Ayo Isa Salami was later compulsorily retired by the then President Goodluck Jonathan who acted under his constitutional authority Subsequently, Justice Isa Ayo Salami was recalled from suspension by the NJC which suspended him but the President refused to approve the action of the NJC (Ahmed, 2022).

In a similar case, Chief Justice of Nigeria, Chief Justice Walter Onnoghen, was suspended on 25 January, 2019 and referred for investigation and trial by the Code of Conduct Tribunal on the charge of non-disclosure of assets. He was subsequently compulsorily retired by President Goodluck Jonathan in a move that led the Independent UN Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, Diego Garcia-Sayán to observe that the dismissal of Nigeria’s Chief Justice by the Executive constituted a grave attack on judicial independence from the State. (Ahmad, 2022)

Executive encroachment on the Independence of the Judiciary is also witnessed at State Level; State Governors have instigated their pliant House of Assembly to achieve their goals of removing Judges that refuse to do their bidding. The ploy was witnessed in Kogi State. More recently, in 2025, the Benue State Governor, Hyacinth Alia instigated the removal of the Chief Justice of the State, Justice Maurice Ikpembese, without reference to the NJC. In both cases, the Judges survived because of procedural missteps by the Governors. Under the Third Schedule to the 1999 Constitution (as Amended), the National Judicial Council (NJC) is the body empowered to exercise disciplinary control over all Judicial Officers of Nigeria. It is also the NJC, established under Section 153(i) of the Constitution (as amended) that has the power to recommend to the Governor, the removal of a judicial officer.

Where a Chief Judge of a state is to be removed, for whatever reason, it is the NJC, not the state House of Assembly that is to recommend to the Governor. The attempts by Governors to take over the disciplinary role of the NJC undermine the independence of the Judiciary and underscore the reality of State Capture

 As part of effort to ensure its independence, the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic  (as amended), Section 80, (7) included funding safeguard by which “The recurrent expenditure of judicial offices in the Federation, in addition to salaries and allowances of the judicial officers charged upon the Consolidated Revenue Fund of the Federation. This apparent measure of independence is often the subject of interference by the Executive or the Legislature at the levels of appropriation and actual release of funds. State Governors have been known to delay the release of funds to the judiciary as a way of extracting subservience or punishment as was the case of Kogi State when the Executive decided to punish the entire staff of the Judiciary when they went on strike for six months in 2021 with the non-payment of their salary. Ahmad (2022) reveals that this was a ploy to frustrate the Chief Judge of the State who was at odds with the Governor.

Competitive Party System, Individual interests and State Capture in Nigeria 

The existence of competitive political parties is one of the features of liberal democracy and Nigeria has embraced the multi-party political system as a basis for leadership recruitment and voter mobilization. The 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic (as Amended) in Chapter IV, Section 221 – 229, guarantees the right to form political parties to ensure freedom of association. It also mandates parties so formed to reflect the diversity of, operate democratically and have headquarters in Abuja. (Section 222). It empowers the Independent National Electoral Commission, (INEC) to register, regulate finances, monitor operations, and enforce standards, with parties needing to meet constitutional criteria for registration and conduct primaries with fairness, avoiding excessive fees or discrimination.

Beyond these Constitutional provisions, the political parties that have been formed in Nigeria since 1999 hardly adhered to the Federal Constitution, the regulations of the INEC or their own regulations. Most of them became the vehicles of political manipulation and outright capture by the political class intent on promoting individual interests than party or national interests. This process is observed in several areas, including (1) lack of internal democracy and imposition of candidates by powerful political godfathers within the parties, (2) Control by moneybags, (3) Charging of excessive fees for candidacy, (4) lack of institutional stability or ideological depth and the endemic crisis of defections.

One of the most vexing challenges among the Nigerian Political Parties is the lack of internal democracy, which leads to imposition of candidates by the powerful forces within the parties. This practice has not only flouted the various regulations guiding the process of selecting candidates, particularly at the primaries and the conventions of the parties. Regulations guiding internal party democracy and political inclusion are well spelt out in the Nigerian Constitution,  (Chapter VI, Section 223, Party Constitutions, the Electoral Act and even the manifestoes of most of the Political Parties. For example, Article 1 of the INEC Regulations for the Conduct of Political Party Primaries for the nominations of candidates into various positions provides that:

           A political party seeking to participate in any election organised by the

                  Commission (INEC) must conduct primaries, wherein all eligible members

               of the party must be given equal opportunity to participate in the primaries

            of the party for the purpose of selecting candidates for elective positions.

However, Nigerian political parties do not comply with this provision. Instead, they create rules and/or impose conditions that exclude the underrepresented groups from emerging as candidates.

The lack of Internal democracy within Nigerian political parties is systemic, pervading all parties without exception. In one study that examined African People’s Congress (APC), People’s Democratic Party (PDP) and African Peoples Grand Alliance (APGA, the study found all the parties guilty of the practices. (Abba, 2017) In the run-up to the general election in 2015, many candidates, including prominent members of the National Assembly and State governors defected from the ruling PDP to join the APC, largely on grounds that candidates had been imposed to supplant them. In Benue State, the incumbent Governor, Dr. Samuel Ortom defected from the APC to the PDP because of a falling out with his Political godfather, Senator George Akume who imposed another candidate to supplant him.

Cases at the Election Petition Tribunals also revealed some of the incidence of imposition of candidates. A classic case was that of one House of Representatives election of Ado/Ogbadibo/Okpokwu constituency of Benue state, where a PDP sole candidate was declared winner by INEC, but was later disqualified by the court, soon after the inauguration of the National Assembly. Also, the party’s screening panel in Bayelsa state disqualified Senator Emmanuel Paulker, the sole aspirant challenging Governor Seriake Dickson for the PDP governorship ticket in the state. Although the ostensible reason for his disqualification was on account of lack of tax clearance.

It has also been observed that party primaries and conventions are mere platforms of voice affirmations of elite consensus, which most times render candidate selection process less credible. (Galadima & Umar 2017, p 47). The Authors conclude that:

Nigerian political parties suffer from serious deficits of internal democracy, thereby not only failing to reflect the mirror image of the envisioned ‘external’ democratic governance and diversity management, but also contributing to the faltering and vexing process of democratic consolidation, exuding foreboding omen of democratic reversal

Similarly, Egwu (2014: p193) argued that a greater percentage of those that emerge from party primaries are products of imposition, consensus and compromise.

One explanation for the practice of imposition of candidates is the control of the party structures by moneybags. These moneybags often referred to as ”Godfathers”, exist in all the main political parties in Nigeria. Agbaje and Adejumo (2006, p.40) identified these powerful individuals to include:

…. informal leaders, who are more powerful than the party chiefs and formal office holders. They sponsor candidates, control the internal party nomination process, finance electoral campaigns, rig elections on behalf of their candidates, corrupt election officials, and sometimes change the names of candidates after elections have been concluded (Agbaje, and Adejumobi 2006 p40)

The basis of power and influence of godfathers is their wealth, which was mostly gained from corrupting the political system and plundering its wealth. It is the same interest that they seek to maintain and have raised the financial stake of contesting elections in Nigeria for the average Nigerian, except through their wealth and influence. They raised the stake by the very prohibitive financial requirement of obtaining nomination forms and guaranteeing sufficient funding for campaigns. The cost of nomination forms for candidacy in local government elections for Chairman of Councils range between five to ten million Naira, while those for the National Assembly range between ten to fifteen Million Naira and that of the Presidency ranges between twenty to thirty million Naira. This is done in flagrant disregard for extant regulations. For example, Article 2 of the INEC Regulations for the Conduct of Political Party Primaries, provides that, “political parties must not create rules or impose conditions or set high expression of interest or nomination fee that could exclude aspirants on the basis of sex, religion, ethnicity, circumstance of birth or wealth”

A final aspect considered here relating to the feature of state capture in the activities of the political parties in Nigeria is the epidemic from defections from political parties. The problem is not only at the epidemic proportion but the migratory habit of some powerful individuals who have been unable to control activities of particular parties or failed to realize their personal interests in their parties have literally turned them into political party nomads. The case of former Vice-President Atiku Abubakar who believes that he is entitled to be President of Nigeria at all cost is illustrative. He has changed political parties at least three times in a bid to capture the Presidency. Several others include Former Governors George Akume, Samuel Ortom. The pattern of defections is not particularly away from or toward the ruling party in 2013, majority of the defections were away from the ruling PDP, with five incumbent governors, that included: Governor Rotimi Amaechi, Governor Abdulfatah Ahmed of Kwara State, Murtala Nyako of Adamawa State, Rabiu Kwankwaso of Kano State and Aliyu Wamaakko of Sokoto State. Following the lead of the Governors, 49 of the ruling PDP legislators in the lower chamber of the national assembly decamped to the APC

The current wave, ahead of the 2027 election is predominantly toward the ruling APC party of President Bola Ahmed Tinubu, which has so far witnessed defection of five governors. These include: Governors Peter Mba of Enugu State, Douyle Diri of Bayelsa State, Sheriff Oborevwori of Delta State, Ume Eno of Akwa Ibom State and Abba Yusuf of Kano State Two others, Governor Caleb Muftwang of Plateau State and Taraba State Governor Agbu Kefas have all indicated their intention to defect to the ruling APC. The case of Governor Ademola Adeleke of Osun State is unique as his defection is to the less known Accord party. Many of these Governors defected along with substantial numbers of the Houses of Assembly.

The defections from political parties are less about party realignments or ideology than they are about personal interests of the various individuals, especially about their interest to hold on to power at all cost and in some cases, because of attempts by their godfathers to impose other candidates as a result of a falling out with these same godfathers.

Free and Fair Elections, the Electoral Management Body (INEC), the Electoral process and State Capture in Nigeria.

The independence of the electoral management body, which in the case of Nigeria is the National Electoral Commission (INEC) is of paramount importance for the integrity of elections and the perception from voters that their votes count. Equally important is the integrity of the process or conduct of elections themselves. The principles of free and fair elections envisioned in liberal democratic order and democracy itself hang upon this vital institution and its performance. The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) is quite robust in attempting to guarantee the independence of INEC, with significant latitude for ensuring free, fair and transparent elections.

To ensure independence of INEC, the Nigerian Constitution of 1999 (as amended), Section 157(1) provides security of tenure for the Chairman and National Commissioners, requiring a two-thirds majority of the Senate for removal on specific grounds. The Constitution prohibited, under Section 158 external direction or control over INEC in the appointment or discipline of its staff. Also, Section 160 (1) grants INEC the power to regulate its own procedures and confer powers without requiring the approval of the President or any other authority.  Under Secttion 81(3) and Section 84, the financial autonomy of INEC is ensured by charging its recurrent and capital expenditures to the Consolidated fund. In addition to these, the Electoral Act 2022 further strengthens INEC independence

Despite all these provisions, State capture manifests in different ways by which political leaders assault independence of electoral institutions. Institutions are captured to advance self-serving interests at the expense of the public. Electoral commissions are either crippled financially or staffed with individuals whose partisanship and loyalty to the government in power are undeniable. This prompted Justice Mohammed Uwais, who was charged with electoral reform in 2008 observed that:

The continuing involvement of the president in the appointment of the INEC chairman and other commissions, as well as resident electoral commissioners, deprives the electoral body of the autonomy it requires to conduct free and fair elections. The present arrangement whereby the electoral body provides INEC the funding also deprives them of financial autonomy and independence (Uwais, cited in  Udeala, 2008).

Different solutions have been offered without any willingness on the part of the executive arm of the government to alter the situation. The perceptions that the recent officials of INEC were not neutral arbiters were borne out by the admission of former INEC Chairman Mahmood Yakubu  that a Governorship candidate for Adamawa State, Hajia Aishatu Dahiru Ahmed Binani, benefited from procurement contract with the Commission  (Asogwa et al. 2022), presented the Chairman as a key figure in the elite network of a captured State.

Apart from questions surrounding key officers of INEC that undermine their independence and capacity for transparent and honest administration of elections in Nigeria, the process of the elections themselves leave large gaps in the level of transparency. The dimensions of electoral malpractice is well documented in the literature (see: Olarinmoye, 2008; Onwuharaonye, Ebere, & Abaneme, 2024; Nwocha, & Igwe 2019, Akuul, 2010).

Electoral malpractice involves the flagrant violations or non-adherence to the rules and regulations governing transparent free and fair elections, for the purpose of personal interests of powerful stakeholders. Since the return to democratic rule in 1999, Nigeria has conducted seven general elections, with the level of electoral malpractice at each occasions, successively getting ever more prevalent and complex. One way to simplify the complexity of electoral malpractice in Nigeria is by identifying, the forms of malpractice before, during and after elections and to identify the key direct participants of malpractice at each stage of the electoral process. Table 2, illustrates this arrangement which, is not exhaustive of the forms of malpractice or the diversity of participants.

Table 2 Electoral Malpractice Before, During and After Elections with Participants

 

Participants	Before Elections	During Elections	After Elections
INEC Officials	1	6	8, 11,9
Godfathers/ Candidates	2, 3	2
Party Agents		2, 3	9
Security Agencies		7
Returning Officers			11, 2
Voters		4, 5

Key to Forms of Malpractice in Nigeria

1. Administrative lapses – delayed arrival at polling units; scarcity of ballot papers

Switching polling units, failure of Bimodal Voter accreditation system, illegal printing of electoral result forms (as in the case of Form EC 8 and EC 8A used in collation and declaration of election results in 2003 and 2007 elections, announcing results in places where no elections were held, unauthorized announcement of election results, inconsistencies on INEC Result viewing portal (IReV)

2. Manipulation of Voters
3. financial inducements
4. Underage voting
5. Fake voting cards
6. Stuffing of ballot boxes
7. Voter intimidation
8. Failure of BVAS and IRev
9. Inconsistencies in Result sheets
10. Ballot snatching and violence
11. False announcement of results

From table 2, it is significant that the INEC bears the greatest responsibility for the most malpractice in Nigerian Elections. Whoever the direct participants are before, during and after the elections, their activities serve mainly the interest of the political class that have captured the process for their selfish goals.

The Crisis Of Liberal Democracy And Governance In Nigeria: Beyond Consolidation And Reform

Nigeria has been experimenting with liberal democracy as a framework for governance since the return to civil rule in 1999. All aspects of the process are in such state that one cannot surmise that any major aspect is consolidating. The legislature and the Judiciary lack the independence that is envisaged in the constitution and which was underpinned by the liberal principle of separation of powers; they have been undermined by the systemic corruption that characterizes a captured state, Elections and the electoral process have remained fundamentally flawed and officials are as compromised as they were in 1999 or even worse, undermining the principle of free, fair and transparent elections. The only area that liberal democracy appears to be working is in the consequence of its economic liberalization, which has led to greater inequality, increased poverty and deprivations. We are witnessing in real time, the crisis of liberal democracy in the state captured of the Nigerian neo-colony.

The failure of liberal democracy to consolidate is what has led to the popular refrain of “reform”. This refrain is loudest in the area of elections. Scholars and policy-makers have been concerned with civil service reforms, institutional reforms, anti-corruption measures as strategies for deepening liberal democracy (Diamond, 2008). Yet these reforms have failed to deepen or consolidate democracy in Nigeria. Since 1999, there have been three attempts at electoral reforms, including the 2002, used for the 2003.2007 election. The second revision of the electoral law was in 2010. This reform introduced the bi-modal registration technology to reduce the various malpractices associated with manual registration. The third reform was in 2022, which was used in the 20023 elections. The 2022 reforms deepened the use of technology by introducing the bi-modal voter accreditation system and the B.VAS for transmitting results to the I.Rev, intended to facilitate real time viewing of results. These all failed to work as intended by the reforms because they became subject to manipulation by forces external forces and their allies at INEC..

The reality is that democracy is not consolidating in Nigeria and the reform efforts will continue to be exercises in futility because of the systemic capture of the Nigerian State. The crisis of liberal democracy cannot be treated with Band-Aid, which the reforms have become. As Schedler (2006) observed, elite control of democratic institutions such as political parties, and elections are not mechanisms for popular sovereignty but arenas of elite competition in which political elites deploy financial resources, patronage, and informal networks to dominate candidate selection and electoral outcomes. What is required is to begin to think outside the worn box of reform.

Thinking outside the box in order to overcome the crisis of liberal democracy in Nigeria requires that we begin to contemplate a non-violent revolutionary change, which at the intellectual and ideological levels, involve carefully weaving together original Athenian conception of democracy with the thoughts of late President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, on African socialism with the peculiar socio-cultural environment of Nigeria. The framework will require the systematic dismantling of the capture nature of the current Nigerian State. The outlook and drivers for this will task the mental resources of committed intellectuals, community leaders and workers, genuinely alarmed at the abyss into which the country is descending.  One obvious solution is to undermine the basis of state capture in Nigeria, which will involve the placing of radical limits on private property and movement toward socialized community ownership and control of the productive assets of the country. It is expected that entrenched interests, including the local and foreign beneficiaries of the captured Nigerian State might offer resistance. This is where community mobilization and leadership as well as productive foreign alliances for strategic defense will lead to genuine transformation of democracy in Nigeria.

                                                References

Abunimye, S. B. ; Iwara, E. I,. Emmanuel, S. (2024). Elections, the judiciary and                           democratic consolidation for socio-economic development in Nigeria.     Jounal of Political Discourse Online: 2992-4618 | Vol. 2, Issue 4, No. 1. 68 –         80

Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S. & Robinson, J. A. (2005). An African success story: Botwana. Working Paper. MIT

Adike, A. N. Ukeje, J.O. & Nwachuku, R.C. O. (2020). Judicial discontent in    democracy: Interrogating the contradictions. research Association for Interdisciplinary Studies (NAIS) DOI: 10.5281/zenado.3751076. 49 -54

Agbaje, A and Adejumobi. S. (2006)”Do votes count? The travails of electoral  politics in Nigeria.”  Africa Development, Vol. xxxi No. 3

Ahmed, A. (2022). Judiciary and democratic governance in Nigeria https//www.researchgate.net/publication/361536818

Ake, C. (1996). Democracy and development in Africa. Washington, Brookings Institution

Akuul,, T. (2010). Electoral malpractice and the survival of democracy in Nigeria.       Journal of Social Policy and Administration 3 (3), 134 -139

Aloysius-Michaels, O. .; Nnamani, K. E.; Ezirim, G. E..;  Enyiazu, C. & Ozo, A.C.    (2021) Does liberal democracy promote economic development? Interrogating electoral cost and development trade-off in Nigeria’s fourth Republic. Cogent Social Science 7:1918370. DOI:.   Org/10.1080/2331.1918370

 Aminu, U, Gbenga. A., & Bolaji, E. K. (2014) Democracy and the performance of            the Nigerian economy. International Journal of Humanities and Social  Science. 10(1), 191-207

 Arowola, D. E. (2025). Democracy and bicameralism in Nigeria: issues, challenges        and the way forward. Review of Public Administration and Management       Vol.3. No. 7. www.arabianjbmr.com/RPAM-index.php

Arugu, O.L. and Charles, S. (2019). Electoral reforms and local government democratization in Nigeria: the missing link. International Journal of         Comparative Studies in International Relations and and Development. Vol. 5, No 1. 79 – 83.

Asogwa, K. C. ;Asogwa, SN, & Romanus, O. U. (2022). State capture and the            quality of  democracy in Nigeria’s fourth republic International Journal of         Comparative Studies in International Relations and Development Vol. 8, No1.

 Azoro, C. J. S.; Onah, C.A. & Agulefo, Q. O. (2021) Weak institutions and poor          governance in Nigeria: A socio-legal perspective. African Journal of Law,  Political Research and Administration Vol 4. Issue 2, 61-70

Buchanan, J.M. & Tullock, G. (1963). Legal corruption. Economics and Politics 23            (2). 196 -210

Chuckwuma, O. S. (2023) The Judiciary and presidential democracy in synthetic  analysis. African Journal of Politics and Administrative Studies (JPA) VOL      10, NO 2  DOI. Org/10.431.4/ajpas. V.16. 12-,38

 Diamond, L. (2008). The Spirit of democracy New York: Times Books.

Dudley, B. (1968) Parties and politics in Northern Nigeria London: Routledge

___      (1973). Instability and political order: Political crisis in Nigeria. Ibadan:  Ibadan University Press

____    (1982) Introduction to Nigerian government and politics. Bloomington: Indiana University Press

Ebegbulem, J. C. (2017). The imperative of democratic consolidation in Nigeria  through credible elections.  African Journal of Politics and Administrative      Studies Vol. 10, No. 1, 70 -86

 Efeurhobo, D. O. &  Egbon, T. N. (2023). The challenges of democratic governance  and development in Nigeria. International Journal of Institutional Leadership,  Policy and Management. Vol 5.Issue. 127 – 135 www.ijlpm.com.ng.

Egwu, S. 2014). Internal democracy in Nigerian political parties, in Obafemi, O. ( ed.)       Political Parties and Democracy in Nigeria.Kuru, NIPSS

Electoral Act, 2022. Federal Republic of Nigria Official Gazette No.61. Vol      109

Erunke, C. E. Ayuba. M.C.; Goni, H., & Liman, D. K. M. (2024). Assessment of             independent national electoral commission (INEC) Implementation of the           Electoral Act 2022 in the 2023 general elections Journal of Political Science           and Policy Studies Vol. 1. No. 2. 101 – 110  https//www.researchgate.net

Federal Republic of Nigeria. (2011). Freedom of Information Act 2011 (FOI)

Galadima, H. U. M. (2017) Dynamics of managing political parties in Nigeria. Kuru:             National Institute for Policy & Strategic Studies (NIPSS)

Helmke, G., and Levitsky, S., (2004). Informal institutions and comparative politics. Perspectives on Politics 2(4).725 -740

Hellman, J.S. Jones, G. & Kaufmann. D. (2000). Seize the state, seize the day:   State capture, corruption and influence in transition World Bank Policy      Research Working Paper. 2444, 1 – 42

Hellman, J. &  Schankerman, M. (2000) Intervention, corruption and capture: the     nexus between enterprises and the state, Economics of Transition, 8(3) 345-5

Ibeanu, O. (2020) Elections and the crisis of democratic governance in Nigeria.  Nigerian Journal of Electoral Studies 2(1). 15 -35

Ibrahim J. (2020). Institutional reforms and electoral integrity in Nigeria: A review of INECs performance. Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD) Working Paper.

 Idris, A. J. (2013) Democracy and development in Nigeria: Is there a link? Arabian Journal of Business and management Review (OMAN Chapter), 3, (3).  85 –  94

 Ilim, M. (2016). Civil society organizations and democratic consolidation in  Nigeria. The Nigerian Journal of Sociology and Anthropology. DOI: 10.36108/NJSA/614(0260).

 Innes, A. (2014). The political economy of state capture in central Europe. Journal of      Common Market 52 (1),  88 -104

 Jinadu, A. (2025). NPSA Engagement with democracy (online) 05/11/2025

 Jombo, O. C. (2022). Executive-Legislative conflicts and the quest for accountability in Nigeria’s presidential democracy: A Case of the 8^th National Assembly. International Journal of Research and Innovation in   Social Science (IJRISS), VOL VI, Issue No. xi.

 Kaufmann, D. (2024)  Comment,  governance action hub https://R4D.org/state-capture-matters-challengingcorruption-new-dataset/

Kaufmann, D. and Vicente, P. C. (2011). Legal corruption. Economics and Politics     23(2). 196 -219

Leftwich, A.  ed. (1996). Democracy and development: theory and practice Policy Press

Lijphart, A. (1977). Democracy in plural societies: A comparative exploration. Yale        University press

Lindblom, C. (1977). Politics and markets: the world’s political –economic systems.  USA: Basic Books

Linz, J.J. and Stepan. A. (1996). Problems of democratic transitions and      consolidation. Baltmore: John Hopkins University Press

Lucky, O. O. & Ma’awayya, A (2017) Democratic transition and consolidation in  Nigeria: trends and prospects since 1999. International Journal of Politics        and      Good Governance Vol. VIII, No 8. 1

MatCite Electoral malpractice  https://www.matcite.com/articles/electoral-malpractice.htmi

Macpherson, C. B.  (1977). The life and times of liberal democracy London: Oxford          University Press

Mumuni, N. A. (2024) Leadership crisis and democratic consolidation in Nigeria.: A discourse using Awolowo’s political philosophy. Acta Politics nr 2/2024 (58)  www.wnus.usz.edu.pl/ap    85-105

Nabiebu, M. & Olu, M. T. (2019). Administrative law and the challenges of good      governance in Nigeria under democratic system of government: The Exigency            of Legal Reforms Frontiers of Finance and Economics No. 17. 15 -36

Ngonadi, A. (2017). Challenges of liberal democracy in Goodluck Jonathan’s       administration From 2010 – 2015 IGWEBUIKE: An African Journal of Arts   and Humanities. Vol 3. No.3

 Nwocha, S. & Igwe (2019). An appraisal of electoral malpractice and violence as an albatross in Nigeria’s democratic consolidation. Beijing Law Review 10(01)     pp77 -87 DOI.10,4236/BLR,2019.101005

 Nzereogu, D. C. (2024). Weak Institutions- A challenge to good governance in Nigeria : Review of Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC)   Nnadiebube Journal of Relegion, Culture and Society (NJRCS) Online 2992-  4618 Vol.2, Issue4. No. 1, 78 -85

O’Connell, J. (1972) Class lecture on Introduction to political science. Ahmadu Bello  University, Zaria.

O’Donnell, G. (2004). The quality of democracy: Why the rule of law matters.           Journal of Democracy 15(4) 32 – 46

 Ogbonna.C.C. & Ogbonna. CR. (2021). Democracy and development in Nigeria:       Understanding the key challenges. KIU Interdisciplinary Journal of    Humanities and Social Sciences 2 (2) 232 -243

 Ojewumi, E. & Adelekan. O. (2025). Challenges of corruption on democratic      governance in Nigeria in the Fourth Republic (1999 -2024) International     Journal of Arts and Social Science Vol 8, Issue 4www.ijassjournal.com

Okafor-Dibua. C. & Nnabuenyi, U. (2025) The Independent National Electoral          Commission and the burden of credible elections in Nigeria. Paper Presented       at the North-Central Zone, NPSA Keffi

 Okeke, R.C. Idike. A. N. (2017). The Judiciary and democracy consolidation in          Nigeria under the Buhari Administration. Science Arena Publication Specialty Journal of Politics and law Vol. 2(4). 24 -32

 Okoronkwo, U, L. Kabiru,A. M. & Gold. N. (2023). Democracy and the economic   development of Nigeria: Contentions and reflections. Global Academic        Journal of Humanities DOI:10.36348/gajhss.2023.VO512.003

 Olarinmoye, O. O. (2008). Godfathers, political parties and electoral corruption in   Nigeria.  African Journal of Political Science and International Relations. Vol. 2(4). 69 -72

 Olu-Adeyemi, L.(212). The Challenges of democratic governance in Nigeria.           International Journal of Business and Social Science Vol. 3. No5, 167- 171

 Omatola, I. J.(2007). Explaining electoral violence in Africa’s new democracies.   Journal of African elections. 51-73

 _____  (2011). Electoral reform and the prospects of democratic             consolidation in          Nigeria. Journal of African Elections Vol. 10. No. 1.  187-207

 Onwuharaonye, S. C.; Ebere, U. & Abaneme, A. O. 2024). Electoral malpractice     and      democratic consolidation in Nigeria. An analytical approach. Nnamdi Azikiwe Journal of Political Science  https://najops.org.//index.php/najops/article/view/265

 Oreoluwa. A. J. (2015). Liberal Democratic perspective of the Nigeria State.   International Journal of Innovation Education and Research Vol.3 No. 10   www.ijier.net

 Pennock, R. J. (1979) Democratic theory Princeton: Princeton University Press

Sahara Reporters (2019) Yahaya Bello, Kogi House of Assembly cannot remove            Chief Judge – High Court. June 18, 2019  https://wwwsaharareporters, com

Saliu. H. A and Ifejika. S.I (2016). The Independent National Electoral Commission    (INEC)

Schedler, A. (2006) Electoral authoritarianism. Boulder: Lynne Reiner

Schumpeter, J. (1950) Capitalism, socialism and democracy.  U.S.A: Harper &         Brothers.

Udeala, S. O. (2024). Analyzing the impact of reform of 2008 on the outcome of the            general elections of 2011..International Journal of Advanced Reasearch in      Public Policy, Social Development and Enterprise Studies. 5(1)             DOI:10.48028/iiprds/ijarppsdes.v5.11.01

Ulu. K.O. and Okogbuo. J.C. (2025) Party defection and crisis of democratic      consolidation in Nigeria 2011 -2019 . South-East Journal of Political Science. Vol. 10. No.2.npsa.se.org.ng

Westra.. R. (2020). Capitalism democracy and the neoliberal authoritarian trifecta. Journal of Australian Political Economy No. 86. 20