By Adagbo Onoja
In a country such as Nigeria where politics, authority and leadership are not moderated by any set of elders; a Left establishment; a media with mystique; a judicial aristocracy with pedigree or a technocracy with a history of mediating the power elite, there is something frightening about the current level of antagonism in Nigeria. While it is true that Nigeria is used to approaching every presidential election as another war, the indicators this time point in a different direction.

All set for victory or defeat in 2027?
It does because of the complete absence of any form of consensus to which all the elite fractions subscribe. Additionally, the social order has been overdrawn in terms of policies which have put so much stress on both the common and the uncommon man. The resulting hunger and anger can be a dangerous combination, particularly in Nigeria where the combination is not guided by any coherent ideological frame beyond ethno-regional and religious intelligibility. Everything said so far is made worse by the complete absence of any individual politician for whom the people would be willing to pour onto the streets and die for what s/he represents in their perception. In almost all circumstances where these variables which moderate power are not available, free-wheeling electoral democracy can be inviting of danger.
Unfortunately, no major voice is drawing attention to the dangers implicit in the scenario unfolding. Everyone is steeling himself and themselves against 2027. Supposing the outcome of 2027 is not a straightforward victory – defeat binary outcome?
Yes, an incumbent regime can be defeated, particularly one that is already jittery and so fearful of the unknown. The fear is all over in the panicky construction of block formations. But a fearful government is not necessarily a completely vulnerable duck. The quip that if ‘they’ could not stop ‘him’ (Tinubu) when he was weakest, how do they hope to easily stop him when he is the emperor and umpire is worth keeping in view.

The winning or losing team in 2027?
In other words, the opposition – incumbent pair right now is not a comfortable balance of contending forces at a time when the legitimacy of the Nigerian State is at its lowest; when the standing of the Nigerian State in the world is at its lowest and when the tension management capability of the fraction in power is nothing to write home about. While it is possible that many layers of interactions might have been going on behind the scene between the leading players, it doesn’t look like there is any systematic thing as existed between late President Shehu Shagari and equally late Chief Obafemi Awolowo in the Second Republic. The testimony from the also late Umaru Dikko is that Awo and Shagari had a meeting at the end of every other month unless one of them was out of the country. As one of the two reporters who conducted the said interview when I worked for Weekly Trust early 1998, I did ask Umaru Dikko how that could have been the case even with the violent volleys from Awo’s battalion of publicists. His reply is that it is the job of aides and publicists to haul invectives on perceived opponents of their boss but a different job for the boss who is a stakeholder in ensuring the preservation of the nation state because neither an incumbent nor an aspirant can achieve the ambition of being in power should the nation state itself be on fire.
From the distance, it doesn’t seem anything of this nature has been going on. Instead of such intra-class tension management practices, what we see is high state officials throwing down the gauntlet, ending up at the centre of messy, unproductive clashes. There may be no better instantiation of this than the Natasha – Akpabio head butting. Predictably, discursive power (Natasha) won over structural/institutional power (Akpabio) in the initial phase, something the Senate President seems incapable of coming to grips with. Without obviously a media team or close advisers that should tell him to back off, he seems determined to win in a contest in which victory may be costlier than defeat. The question is why might the Number Three citizen in the country want to go for a test of strength with any other citizens when he could equally use more conciliatory tactics and enhance the legitimacy of his office?

A hidden winner or a no-show in 2027?
One could be guilty of singularism in exemplifying with the Natasha-Akpabio example but it is the most current and, therefore, most fitting illustration of the analysis I am pursuing. It has been so since 1999, with the possible exceptions of Dr Goodluck Jonathan and Atiku Abubakar. Even Chief Obasanjo is no less guilty of testing of strength, right at the height of his power. The only difference is that he had fantastic gate keepers, from his NSA, the Secretary to the Government of the Federation, the Chief of Staff to even the ADC (the first one who later died in an accident) who moderated his excesses as we saw when Obasanjo invaded Chief Sunday Awoniyi’s house, asking him to clear out his guests. Obasanjo had hardly left Chief Awoniyi’s house before the then Chief of Staff followed to mend fences. That made General Mohammad the quintessential gate keeper, the aide’s aide.
It is not clear if the current opposition elements are free of this tendency to exacerbate tension as much as high state officials. Otherwise, why does Peter Obi have to sound apologetic for meeting the president in Rome? It is not meeting with Tinubu that is the problem but his response to what Tinubu might have asked him to do. There is thus something awkward in his extreme sensitivity to the moral categories of his followers who do not appear to realise that Obi is in politics which is about engaging with contenders for power. After all, who knows if Obi may not collect the baton from Tinubu?
At this rate, it looks like there has been a generational shift in which high state officials do not give a damn about sending signals that they do not have the instincts of statism, contrary to the broad typology of the power elite in Nigeria that, as reckless as they could be, they know when to pull the stop. As such, the country is never plunged into a Somalia or Rwanda scenario. A message of such a shift is what is issuing forth from what happened to Dele Farotimi and the dragging of the brawl between Senators Natasha and Akpabio.

Obasanjo : Could have been a far more influential and restraining voice if he were no longer fielding candidates
This rather sociological or academic inference may not be a correct reading of the scenario but that is an inference supported by current indicators. The danger in that possibility is that a ruling elite that allows such an inference to gain ground interrogates itself. And such self-interrogation have implications, both for members of each of the fractions and for the larger society, with particular reference to the possibility of a costly stalemate in 2027 if care is not taken.
The state of the nation is already so bad that 2027 should, in the circumstance, not be the defining item on the agenda of Nigerian politics right now. Instead of putting everything to 2027, there should be a single-minded commitment to the construction and adoption of a Social Charter for Nigerians. That is a document which outlines how Nigeria may be re-invented. A document that shows how Nigerian children will go to school, access health facilities, resume industrialising, be sheltered and so on. One is referring to a development strategy rather than a dumb document with many dumb statements. A document that suggests a strategy of mass housing, for example, why, what stocks of housing will be needed between when and when and how they will be funded. Or a programme of getting Nigeria industrialised: which variant of industrialisation strategy; why; when, how it will be financed and the external context of such a dare, amongst others. This way, Nigeria would have succeeded in putting the people rather than politicians and their craving for political office at the centre of 2027. Above all, it enables Nigerians to test which sets of politicians are pro-people or anti-people in more concrete terms. Anything short of this would be mere deception, not democracy.
The strategy of a Social Charter NOW offers a very fair opportunity to both the incumbent and the opposition. Commitment to a negotiated Social Charter gives the incumbent an opportunity to demonstrate renewal of hope unlike its current clumsy endgame. Disinclination to a Social Charter complicates the incumbent’s chances in 2027. On the other hand, a Social Charter process offers the opposition opportunity to showcase a redemption checklist in 2027 by what it considers crucial immediately. That can enhance its chances in 2027. This is the most viable option at this moment because the nation has to get out of the current dislocation (system collapse), re-legitimise the social order and its processes before elections can follow. Otherwise, and in the context of power not moderated by variables which normally moderate exercise of power, there are risks in the current mindless muddling through.
It is sad enough that Nigeria is nowhere at a time of immense material progress across the world under informationalised capitalism, it will be worse if the country slips into another unproductive stalemate similar or even worse than June 12. This can very easily happen since each of the discourses which produce the realities we deal with comes along with that slippery thing called radical contingency. Radical contingency means that no scheming or planning, no matter how elaborate, have any guarantee of certainty. In fact, to be certain about anything in the social world is to experiment with foolishness although this does not mean we should not plan. We may plan but we must also note that the variables at work are too numerous for things to always work according to most plans. The heterogeneity of the fractions and interests within the Nigerian “ruling class” complicates this. Still, another Nigeria is not only possible, it has become an imperative!